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1 Introduction
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) praise the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
with the words: “The CAPM is widely viewed as one of the two or three major
contributions of academic research to financial managers during the post-war
era.” The commonly used derivations of the CAPM from first principles like
utility maximization and return distributions are, however much less accepted
in our profession. Conventional wisdom, as it shows up in our textbooks (see
for example Copeland and Weston (1998)), usually derives the CAPM from the
expected utility hypothesis and from normally distributed returns. Ever since it
was axiomatically founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage
(1954), the expected utility assumption has been under severe fire as a descriptive
theory of investors‘ behavior. Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) are three prominent cornerstones of this critique. As De Bondt
(1999) has recently put it: “For at least 40 years, psychologists have amassed
evidence that ’economic man (Edwards, The Theory of Decision-Making, 1954) -
is very unlike a real man’ and that reason - for now, defined by the principles that
underlie expected utility theory, Bayesian learning, and rational expectations -
is not an adequate basis for a descriptive theory of decision making.”
In 2002 the work of Kahneman and Tversky has been rewarded the Nobel
price in economics for providing an alternative to expected utility: prospect the-
ory – a theory that is consistent with the psychology of the investor. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) is the seminal paper on prospect theory. In Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) they have suggested to change their theory in one important
aspect. Instead of using distortions of probabilities they preferred to use distor-
tions of the cumulative distribution function because this will keep consistency
of investors‘ decisions with first order stochastic dominance. In this paper we
will focus on the cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Kahneman and Tversky‘s
prospect theory deviates from the expected utility hypothesis in four important
aspects.
• Investors evaluate assets according to gains and losses and not according
to final wealth.
• Investors dislike losses by a factor of 2.25 as compared to their liking of
gains.
• Investors‘ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are s-shaped with
turning point at the origin.
• Investors probability assessments are biased in the way that extremely
small probabilities (extremely high probabilities) are over- (under-) valued.
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We demonstrate that although prospect theory deviates from the expected
utility hypothesis in these important directions still prospect theory is consis-
tent with Mean-Variance Analysis and the Security Market Line (SML) Theo-
rem, provided one keeps the assumption of normally distributed returns. Hence,
prospect theory could be seen as a behavioral foundation of these two impor-
tant features of the CAPM. However, under the specific functional forms sug-
gested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) financial market equilibria do not exist.
Therefore, we suggest alternative functional forms consistent with the results of
Tversky and Kahneman, for which equilibria do exist. In a companion paper
Levy, De Giorgi and Hens (2003) also show that the SML-Theorem holds for
CPT when returns are normally distributed. That paper is however based on a
different method as it is based on stochastic dominance. Moreover, the issue of
existence of equilibria, which is a central point of this paper is not addressed in
Levy, De Giorgi and Hens (2003).
Our paper may help to explain, why behavioral finance has discovered dif-
ficulties to pin down behavioral factors that should replace or complement the
market portfolio. Moreover, our paper may help to explain the ”The Paradox of
Asset Prices”, as Bossaert (2002) has dubbed it, according to which individual
behavior in laboratory experiments contradicts the expected utility hypothesis
while the laboratories market prices satisfy the CAPM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will out-
line the standard CAPM-model with exogenously given riskfree rate of return as
presented by Sharpe (1964). The mathematical approach, as it is now standard
for the CAPM, is taken from Duffie (1988). In Section 3 we demonstrate that the
CPT of Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) leads to the mean-variance principle,
Tobin Separation and the Mutual Fund Theorem. Hence the security market line
theorem of the CAPM holds. In Section 4 we then show that with the specific
functional forms for the utility function suggested by Tversky and Kahnemann
(1992) no equilibria exist. Finally, we propose an alternative functional form for
the utility index for which equilibria do exist.
2 The Model
The description of the model follows Duffie (1988, section I.11). Let (M,M, η) be
a probability space. Consider L, the space of real–valued measurable functions
on (M,M, η). We endow L with the scalar product x · y := ∫M x(m)y(m)dη
and with the norm ‖x‖ =
√
(x · x). The consumption set will be the subset of
4
L with finite norm, L2(η) = {x ∈ L | ‖x‖2 < ∞}1. The price space is also
L2(η). Denote the expectation of a portfolio x by µ(x) :=
∫
M x(m)η(dm) and
the covariance of x, y ∈ L2(η) by cov(x, y) = µ(xy) − µ(x)µ(y). The standard
deviation of x is accordingly σ(x) :=
√
cov(x, x).
Let the marketed subspace, X, be generated as the span of (Aj)j=0,1,...,J , a
collection of securities in L2 (η), one of which is the riskless asset 1I. To nail
down the notation, say asset 0 is the riskless asset, A0 = 1I. With respect to the
riskless asset every payoff x in X can be decomposed x = x⊥ + x‖ into one part
x‖ collinear to 1I and one part x⊥ orthogonal to 1I. Of course, orthogonality is
meant with respect to the scalar product · just defined.
Assumption 1 (Asset Payoffs)
Asset payoffs Aj ∈ L2 are normally distributed, i.e. Aj ∼ N(µj, σj), j = 1, .., J .
The supply of risky asset j = 1, . . . , J is exogenously given and denoted by θ¯j > 0.
The riskfree asset is in elastic supply, with exogenously given price 1
1+r
, where
r is the riskfree rate of return. The market portfolio is the sum of all available
risky assets, i.e. ω =
∑J
j=1Aj θ¯j. It is assumed that the market portfolio has
positive expectation and variance, i.e. µ(ω) > 0 and σ2(ω) > 0. We say that X
has a Hamel basis of jointly normal random variables.
There are i = 1, ...I investors, also called agents or consumers. They are initially
endowed with wealth wi > 0. The numbers θij denote the amount of security
j held by agent i, qj denotes the j-th security price. Thus, when trading these
securities, the agent can attain the consumption plan x =
∑J
j=0Aj θ
i
j where θ
i
satisfies the budget restriction (i.e.
∑J
j=0 qj θ
i
j ≤ wi).
Agents evaluate consumption plans according to prospect theory utility func-
tions. The first principle of prospect theory is that agents do not evaluate utility
according to some utility function Uˆ i(x) on final wealth, but they evaluate port-
folio choices, using some utility function U i, based on gains and losses, i.e. based
on changes in wealth. This can well be accommodated by using the transfor-
mations Uˆ i(x) = U i(x − βwi1I) and U i(∆x) := Uˆ i(∆x + βwi1I). Note that we
did introduce a time preference β > 1 into the utility function. Hence agents
do discount future payoffs. That is to say an investment opportunity has pro-
duced a gain only if it has generated sufficient payoffs to compensate for the
delay in delivering payoffs. We assume that β = 1 + r, i.e. investors evaluate
gains and losses with respect to the riskfree investment. Choosing the riskfree
rate of return as reference point means to frame decisions with respect to excess
returns, which is in the spirit of the security market line theorem. Given the
1L2(η) is the set of equivalent classes with respect to the equivalence relation x ∼ y ⇔
η(x 6= y) = 0. L2(η) = L2(pi) for all pi ∼ η.
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initial wealth and the time preference, every assumption on the utility function
U i translates to an according assumption on Uˆ i and vice versa. Since one of the
assets is the riskless bond, 1I ∈ X, the changes of wealth ∆x = x− βwi1I are in
the marketed subspace X. Having said this, we advance to the other important
assumptions that are made in the CPT.
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Assumption 2 (CPT-preferences)
Every agent‘s utility function can be represented as
U i(∆x) =
∫
IR
ui(∆y) d (T i ◦ Φ(∆y)) for all ∆x ∈ X, (1)
where
• ui is a two-times differentiable function on IR \ {0}, strictly increasing on
IR, strictly concave on (0,∞) and strictly convex on (−∞, 0),
• T i is a differentiable, non-decreasing function from [0,1] onto [0,1] with
T i(p) = p for p = 0 and p = 1 and with T i(p) > p (T i(p) < p) for p small
(large),
• Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function for the payoffs ∆x.
Hence, the utility function ui captures loss aversion because it needs not be
differentiable at 0. Moreover, it is convex-concave. The function T i transforms
the cumulative probabilities as required by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
The portfolio choice problem is:
max
θ∈ IRJ+1:
∑J
j=0
qj θj≤wi
x=
∑J
j=0
Aj θj
U i
(
x− βwi1I
)
(2)
Which can equivalently be written as:
max
θ∈ IRJ+1:
∑J
j=0
qj θj≤wi
x=
∑J
j=0
Aj θj
Uˆ i (x) (3)
The CAPM is an equilibrium model. We are therefore interested in analyzing
competitive equilibria for the financial market of this paper:
Definition 1
Given a riskfree rate r, a financial market equilibrium consists of a price vector
∗
q∈ IRJ+1 with ∗q0= 11+r and an allocation
∗
θi∈ IRJ+1, i = 1, ..., I, such that
(i)
∗
θi maximizes U i(
∑
j Ajθ
i
j − βwi1I) subject to
∑
j
∗
qj θ
i
j ≤ wi, i = 1, ..., I, and
(ii)
I∑
i=1
∗
θij = θ¯j, j = 1, ..., J .
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Note that given the riskfree rate, a financial markets equilibrium determines
the J prices of the risky assets by clearing the J markets for the risky assets.
Instead of analyzing financial markets equilibria as defined in the Definition 1,
in the CAPM it is most useful to first transform the decision problem into some
abstract problem that uses the structure of the underlying probability space.
To do this, note that a necessary condition for the portfolio decision problem
given above to have a solution is that consumers cannot exploit an arbitrage
opportunity. Since the CPT utility U i and hence also the utility Uˆ i is strictly
increasing, this means that the agent cannot find a portfolio that almost surely
delivers positive payoffs without requiring any payments. Asset prices are thus
arbitrage free only if the following equation holds:
L2+ ∩
{
x ∈ L2 (η)
∣∣∣x = ∑Jj=0Aj θj where ∑Jj=0 qj θj ≤ 0} = {0} . (4)
Let q ∈ IRJ+1 be an abitrage free price vector. Under Assumption 1, an
arbitrage free price vector q needs to satisfy q0 > 0. By the Dalang-Morton-
Willinger Theorem (see for example Delbaen 1999), there exists a probability
measure pi on (M,M), pi ∼ η such that qj
q0
= IEpi [Aj] for all j = 1, . . . , J . Here we
consider discounted prices qj
q0
. Note that q0 =
1
1+r
. We obtain qj =
1
1+r
IEpi [Aj].
We can rewrite the pricing rule by defining the Radon-Nikodym Derivative of
pi with respect to η, the so called likelihood ratio process ` = dpi
dη
∈ L2(η) and
we obtain qj =
1
1+r
µ(`Aj) =
1
1+r
` · Aj. At an equilibrium the price system ` is
also called ’ideal security’ (Magill and Quinzii 1996) or ’pricing portfolio’ (Duffie
1988). Applying the pricing rule to the portfolio decision problem recognizing
the way x is generated by θ, delivers the so called no-arbitrage decision problem
max
x∈X
Uˆ i (x) , ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi. (5)
To gain intuition on the Dalang-Merton-Willinger Theorem, we briefly consider
the case for M finite, M = 2|M | and η(m) > 0 for all m ∈ M . The arbitrage
free equation (4) implies thatx =
J∑
j=0
Aj θj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
J∑
j=0
qj θj ≤ 0
 ∩
{
h ∈ L2 (η)
∣∣∣∣∣h ≥ 0, ∑
m∈M
h(m) = 1
}
= ∅.
Let K =
{
x =
∑J
j=0Aj θj
∣∣∣∑Jj=0 qj θj ≤ 0}. K defines a sub-space of L2(η). Let
P = {h ∈ L2 (η) |h ≥ 0,∑m∈M h(m) = 1}. Since K ∩ P = ∅, then by Farka’s
Lemma we find a linear functional Ψ on L2(η) with Ψ(f) = 0 for f ∈ K and
Ψ(h) > 0 for h ∈ P . Moreover, by the Riesz Representation Theorem (see Duffie
1988, Chapter I.6) we find ψ ∈ L2(η) with Ψ(g) = µ(ψ g) for all g ∈ L2(η). Let
m ∈ M and define hm by hm(m′) = 1 if m′ = m and hm(m′) = 0 else. hm is
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the Arrow security for state m. Obviously hm ∈ P and 0 < Ψ(hm) = ψ(m)η(m)
for all m ∈ M . Since η(m) > 0 then ψ(m) > 0. We define ` = ψ
µ(ψ)
and a
probability measure pi on (M,M) by pi(m) = `(m)η(m). We have
µ(ψ)−1Ψ(g) =
∑
m∈M
g(m)pi(m) = IEpi [g] .
Consider the following investment: Borrow θ0 = −1 units of the riskfree asset,
to finance θi =
q0
qi
units of asset i ∈ {1, . . . , J} (θk = 0 for k 6= 0, i). Then,
x =
∑J
j=0 θj Aj ∈ K and thus µ(ψ)−1Ψ(x) = IEpi [x] = 0. It follows:
qj =
q0
IEpi [1I]
IEpi [Aj] =
1
1 + r
IEpi [Aj] .
Since we restrict the pricing rule just described to X, we can assume without
loss of generality2 that ` ∈ X. In fact, if ` /∈ X, we can decompose ` into one
part `‖ in X and one part `⊥ orthogonal to X. Since for all x ∈ X, `⊥ · x = 0,
the pricing rule can be rewritten as `‖ · x. Thus, we assume ` ∈ X. Back to the
no-arbitrage decision problem (5), we can now give an equivalent definition of
financial markets equilibria that is easier to analyze than the Definition 1:
Definition 2
Given a riskfree rate r, a financial market equilibrium consists of a price vector
∗
` ∈ X and an allocation
∗
xi∈ L2(η), i = 1, ..., I, such that (i)
∗
xi maximizes Uˆ i(x)
subject to x ∈ X and ∗` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi, i = 1, ..., I, and (ii)
I∑
i=1
∗
x
i
⊥= ω.
3 Results
Before we exploit the specific assumptions, Assumption 1 and 2, made in the
previous section we will briefly recall what can already be said with respect to
asset prices.
Proposition 1 (Asset Pricing)
Let y be any payoff in X and define q(y) :=
∑
j qjθj for some θ with y =
∑
j Ajθj.
Then we obtain that in any financial market equilibrium the likelihood ratio pro-
cess ` is the only risk factor of the model, i.e. q(y) = 1
1+r
(µ(y) + cov(y, `)).
2This assumption just refers to the pricing rule ` · x and not to the way ` is obtained. It
might occur that the new ` cannot be written as Radon-Nikodym Derivative with respect to
some equivalent probability measure.
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Proof.
This pricing formula follows immediately from No-arbitrage pricing:
(1 + r) qj = ` · Aj = µ(`Aj) = µ(`)µ(Aj) + cov(`, Aj)
noting that µ(`) = 1.
We now demonstrate that, given returns are normally distributed (Assump-
tion 1), then utility functions according to CPT (Assumption 2) are actually
functions of the mean and variance only.
Proposition 2 (Mean-Variance Preferences)
With normally distributed returns (Assumption 1), preferences according to CPT
(Assumption 2) are mean-variance preferences that are increasing in mean, i.e.
for all ∆x ∈ X
U i(∆x) = V i(µ(∆x), σ(∆x))
and V i is strictly increasing in µ.
Proof.
For any portfolio θ let µθ = µ(∆xθ) = µ(
∑
j Ajθj − ` · xθ), σθ = σ(∆xθ) =
σ(
∑
j Ajθj), denote the resulting mean-variances of the portfolio‘s relative pay-
off. By Assumption 1 each individual asset payoff is normally distributed with
parameters µj, σj hence also the portfolio‘s relative payoff is normally distributed
with the parameters µθ, σθ. That is to say, applying equation (1), the agent eval-
uates changes in wealth according to
U i(∆x) =
∫
IR
ui(∆y) d (T i ◦ Φµθ,σθ(∆y)) for all ∆x ∈ X.
Let Φˆ(x) := Φ(x−µ
σ
) denote the standardized cumulative normal distribution.
Then using the transformation of variables ∆y → σθ∆y + µθ we obtain that
U i(∆x) =
∫
IR
ui(∆y σθ + µθ) d (T
i ◦ Φˆ(∆y)) for all ∆x ∈ X.
Hence U i is a function of the portfolio‘s mean and variances. Moreover, since ui
is strictly increasing and since T i is non-decreasing with T i(p) = p for p = 0, 1,
U i is strictly increasing in the mean. The same properties carry over to the
function Uˆ i, since it is identical to U i up to the shift in the mean µθ+(1+ r)w
i.
Note that for proving this last result, we essentially use that ui is strictly
increasing and that T i is non-decreasing. Thus, Proposition 2 applies to all
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utility functions satisfying equation (1) where ui is strictly increasing and T i
non-decreasing with T i(p) = p for p = 0, 1.
The mean-variance property of preferences is the main property to derive the
Tobin Separation Principle and thus to derive the Mutual Fund Theorem:
Proposition 3 (Tobin Separation)
Let xi ∈ argmaxx∈X Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi for i = 1, . . . , I and suppose
that µ(ω) > ` · ω. Then xi = ψ˜i1I − φ˜i` for some scalars φ˜i ≥ 0, ψ˜i for every
i = 1, ..., I.
Proof.
We prove Proposition 3 by the following four steps.
(1) Budget restriction holds with equality.
Let xi ∈ argmaxx∈X Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi. Since there is a riskless asset
and since the function Uˆ i is increasing in µ, then at any optimal solution xi the
budget restriction holds with equality, i.e. ` · xi = (1+ r)wi for all i. Otherwise
it would be possible to further increase the utility by buying the riskfree asset.
(2) Agents are variance averse.
Let xi ∈ argmaxx∈X Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi and suppose that µ(ω) > ` · ω.
Since µ(ω) > ` · ω, then µ(ω−q(ω)
q(ω)
) > r, i.e. the return on the market portfolio is
greater than the risk free return r and thus, if investor i were not variance averse
at xi, she would then short sell the risk free asset and buy the market portfolio,
increasing in this way her utility and contradicting the optimality of xi.
(3) Tobin’s Separation.
Let xi ∈ argmaxx∈X Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi and suppose that µ(ω) > ` · ω.
Decompose xi = yi+zi where zi is perpendicular to 1I and ` and yi ∈ span(1I, `) ⊂
X. From the decomposition it follows that ` · zi = 0 so that yi ∈ X is budget
feasible. Moreover, from zi being perpendicular to 1I it is obtained that µ(xi) =
µ(yi). Suppose that zi 6= 0, then
σ2(xi) = σ2(xi⊥) = ‖xi⊥‖2 = ‖yi⊥ + zi⊥‖2 = ‖yi⊥‖2 + ‖zi⊥‖2
> ‖yi⊥‖+ ‖zi⊥‖2 = σ2(yi⊥) = σ2(yi)
because zi⊥ is perpendicular to y
i
⊥, where the subscript ⊥ denotes the component
of each vector orthogonal to 1I. Since by (2) investors are variance averse at the
optimal allocation xi, then zi = 0. Therefore xi = ψ˜i1I − φ˜i` for some scalars
φ˜i, ψ˜i for every i = 1, ..., I, i.e. Tobin’s Separation holds.
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(4) φ˜i ≥ 0 .
From (3) we obtain xi = ψ˜i1I − φ˜i`. It remains to show that φ˜i ≥ 0. From
xi = ψ˜i1I − φ˜i` and the budget equality ` · xi = (1 + r)wi, it follows µ(xi) =
(1+r)wi+ φ˜iσ2(`) and σ(xi) = |φ˜i|σ(l). If φ˜i < 0, then, because by Proposition
2 V i is increasing in µ one could increase the utility by buying the asset ψ˜i1I+φ˜i`,
a contradiction to the optimality of xi.
The next result shows that without loss of generality we can work in the
famous mean-variance diagram.
Corollary 1 (Mean-Variance Principle)
Suppose that µ(ω) > ` · ω, then the decision problems
xi ∈ argmax
x∈X
Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi
and
(µi, σi) ∈ arg max
(µ,σ)∈IR×IR+
V i(µ− (1 + r)wi, σ) s.t. µ− qσ = (1 + r)wi
are equivalent, where q = σ(`) > 0.
Proof.
¿From step (4) of the proof of Proposition 3 we obtain µ(xi) = (1 + r)wi +
σ(xi)σ(`) for any optimal solution xi of the first decision problem. Moreover, by
Proposition 2, (µ(xi), σ(xi)) maximizes V i. On the other hand, for any solution
(µi, σi) of the second decision problem we can find unique ψ˜i and Φ˜i ≥ 0 such
that xi = ψ˜i1I− φ˜i` has mean µi and variance σi. ¿From the budget restriction
of the second decision problem, it follows that xi is budget feasible for investor
i. Moreover, by Proposition 2, xi maximizes Uˆ i.
Now we are in a position to consider the equilibrium consequences of what
we discovered so far:
Proposition 4 (Mutual Fund Theorem)
Given a riskfree rate r, let (
∗
`,
∗
x) with
∗
x = (
∗
x
1
, ...,
∗
x
I
) be a financial market
equilibrium and suppose µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω. Then there exist scalars φi ∈ IR+, i =
0, 1, ..., I , and scalars ψi ∈ IR, i = 0, 1, ..., I such that ∗` = ψ01I + φ0ω and
∗
x
i
= ψi1I− φiω for every i = 1, ..., I.
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Proof.
By Tobin’s Separation (Proposition 3)
∗
x
i
= ψ˜i1I− φ˜i ∗` for some scalars φ˜i ≥ 0, ψ˜i
for every i = 1, ..., I. Since in equilibrium
∑
i
∗
x
i
⊥= ω⊥ we get
∑
i
∗
x
i
= α1I + ω
for some α ∈ IR. Hence there exist scalars φ0 ≥ 0, ψ0 such that ∗`= ψ01I − φ0ω.
Using this last equation, we obtain
∗
x
i
= ψi1I−φiω for some scalars φi ≥ 0, ψi for
every i = 1, ..., I.
The main conclusion of the CAPM, the Security Market Line Theorem, is
now straightforward:
Proposition 5 (Security Market Line Theorem)
Suppose that the gross return of the market portfolio is greater than the risk free
gross return, i.e. µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω. Then, given asset payoffs are normally distributed
(Assumption 1) and agents have prospect theory utility functions (Assumption
2), at every financial market equilibrium (
∗
`,
∗
x) the security market line holds,
i.e. for any payoff y ∈ X
µ(ry)− r = cov(ry, rω)
σ2(rω)
(µ(rω)− r) (6)
where ry =
y−q(y)
q(y)
and rω =
ω−q(ω)
q(ω)
.
Proof.
Inserting the Mutual Fund Theorem expression for
∗
` = ψ01I−φ0ω into the asset
pricing formula derived in Proposition 1, gives:
(1 + r)q(y) = µ(y)− φ0cov(ω, y).
Applying this formula for y = ω we can determine φ0 > 0 as
φ0 =
µ(ω)− (1 + r) q(ω)
σ2(ω)
.
Hence we obtain:
(1 + r)q(y) = µ(y)− µ(ω)− (1 + r)q(ω)
σ2(ω)
cov(ω, y),
which can also be written as
(1 + r) q(y)− µ(y) = cov(ω, y)
σ2(ω)
((1 + r)q(ω)− µ(ω)) .
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Dividing this equation by q(y) and dividing the numerator and the denominator
on the RHS of this equation by q2(ω) delivers the result.
So far we have assumed that the market portfolio has a higher return than
the risk free rate. As the following remark shows, for the utility functions of
Kahneman and Tversky (1992), this has indeed to be the case at any financial
market equilibrium. As we show later this will also be the case for the utility
function that we propose.
Remark (The condition µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω needs to hold in equilibrium)
Suppose µ(ω) ≤ ∗` ·ω, then at any financial market equilibrium (∗`, ∗x) we get
µ(
∗
x
i
) = (1 + r)wi for i = 1, . . . , I. In fact, the condition µ(ω) ≤ ∗` ·ω implies
that
∑I
i=1 µ(
∗
x
i
) ≤ (1 + r)∑Ii=1wi and thus there exists at least one investor j ∈
{1, . . . , I} such that µ(∗xj) ≤ (1+ r)wj. Note that assets α ∗xj +(1−α)(1+ r)wj
are budget feasible for investor j, for all α ∈ IR and moreover,
µ
(
α
∗
x
j
+(1− α)(1 + r)wj
)
= α (µ(
∗
x
j
)− (1 + r)wi) + (1 + r)wj,
σ
(
α
∗
x
j
+(1− α)(1+ ∗r)wj
)
= |α| σ(∗xj)
for all α ∈ IR. Take α = −1, then from the previous equations for mean and
variance, it follows that, if µ(
∗
x
j
) < (1+
∗
r)wj, then investor j could increase the
mean of her portfolio, without affecting the variance and thus could increase
her utility (strictly increasing in µ) by short selling
∗
x
j
and buying the risk free
asset. This would contradict the optimality of
∗
x
j
, thus µ(
∗
x
j
) = (1 + r)wj.∑I
i=1 µ(
∗
x
i
) ≤ (1 + r) ∑Ii=1wi together with the equality µ(∗xj) = (1 + r)wj
which holds for the selected investor j, imply that µ(
∗
x
i
) = (1 + r)wi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Since σ(ω) > 0, we find k ∈ {1, . . . , I} with σk = σ(∗xk) > 0, i.e.
investor’s k optimal choice
∗
x
k
is Gaussian distributed with mean (1 + r)wk and
strictly positive variance. Thus, V k(0, σk) > V k(0, 0), where V k is the mean-
variance preference induced by Uk (Proposition 2). But this contradict the CPT
assumption for Uk (see Introduction and Assumption 2), since in fact no investor
who dislikes losses by a factor 2.25 as compared to gains, and chooses the risk
free investment as reference point, prefers payoff
∗
x
k
to the risk free investment!
In particular, let us consider the utility index u and transformation T proposed
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by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
u(x) =
{
xα for x ≥ 0,
−λ(−x)β for x < 0, (7)
T (p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ) 1γ
. (8)
where β = α = 0.88, λ = 2.25 and γ = 0.61 for gains and γ = 0.69 for losses.
The induced mean-variance preference V k satisfies V k(0, σ) = c σα for all σ ≥ 0,
where c ≈ −0.34. Therefore V k(0, σ) < V k(0, 0) for all σ > 0, i.e. no investor
will choose a positive variance.
In summary, this remark has shown that the existence of financial market equi-
libria for the case µ(ω) ≤ ` · ω is not consistent with Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) assumptions for the utility functions.
4 Existence of Equilibria
Up to now we have assumed that a financial market equilibrium exists. This as-
sumption implies that each investor’s decision problem has a solution (Definition
1 and 2). The no arbitrage condition expressed by equation (4), is a necessary
condition for the existence of a solution of the investor’s decision problem, but
it is not sufficient. To understand why the investor‘s decision problem may fail
to have a solution, let us consider the following general example.
Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and the no arbitrage condition
(4) holds. Let ` be the pricing portfolio. We suppose, as in Proposition 3, 4 and
5, that µ(ω) > ` · ω and we define δ(ω) = µ(ω)−`·ω
σ(ω)
. Note that δ(ω) corresponds
the the Sharpe Ratio of the market portfolio µ(rω)−r
σ(rω)
(Sharpe 1994). Let ω˜ =
(1 + r) w
k
`·ω ω. Then ω˜ is budget feasible for investor k and δ(ω˜) = δ(ω) > 0. We
consider the leveraged portfolio x(α) = α ω˜ + (1− α)(` · ω˜) 1I. Then
` · x(α) = ` · ω˜,
µ (x(α)) = α (µ(ω˜)− ` · ω˜) + ` · ω˜,
i.e. x(α) is budget feasible and µ (x(α))↗∞ as α↗∞.
Suppose, for sake of simplicity, that investor k does not transform the distri-
bution function, i.e. T k(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1] and uses the utility index
uk(x) =

f(x) for x > 0;
0 for x = 0;
−λ f(−x) for x < 0,
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where f(x) = x is the linear function on (0,∞) and λ ≈ 2.25 (see Barberis,
Huang and Santos 2001). We consider the utility function Uk on the set {x(α) |α >
0}. We have:
V k(α) = Uk(x(α)) = V k(αµ(ω˜)− α ` · ω˜, ασ(ω˜))
=
∫
IR
uk (α(σ(ω˜)x+ µ(ω˜)− ` · ω˜)) dΦˆ(x)
= α
[∫ ∞
−δ(ω)
(σ(ω˜)x+ µ(ω˜)− ` · ω˜) dΦˆ(x)
+
∫ −δ(ω)
−∞
λ (σ(ω˜) x+ µ(ω˜)− ` · ω˜) dΦˆ(x)
]
= α
[
(µ(ω˜)− ` · ω˜)
(
1 + (λ− 1) Φˆ(−δ(ω))
)
+ σ(ω˜) (λ− 1) ϕˆ(δ(ω))
]
= α c(λ, δ(ω)).
where ϕˆ is the probability density of the standard normal distribution. For the
U.S. economy, Mehra (2003) gives an estimate of the long-term Sharpe Ratio of
δ(ω) = 0.34 and c(2.25, 0.34) > 0. Thus investor k can infinitely increase her
utility by infinitely leveraging the market portfolio and therefore no solution to
her decision problem would exist.
Tversky and Kahnemann (1992).
We restrict now our attention to the utility index and probability transformation
proposed by Tversky and Kahnemann, which are defined in equations (7) and
(8). For the reasoning of this subsection it will be important to allow for some
possibly small heterogeneity in agents preferences. Therefore let:
ui(x) =
{
xα
i
for x ≥ 0,
−λi(−x)αi for x < 0, (9)
T i(p) =
pγ
i(
pγi + (1− p)γi
) 1
γi
. (10)
The Corollary 1 to the Tobin’s Separation Theorem implies that for any
pricing portfolio ` with µ(ω) > ` · ω, xi solves
max
x∈X
Uˆ i(x) s.t. ` · x ≤ (1 + r)wi
iff (µ(xi), σ(xi)) solves
max
(µ,σ)∈IR×IR+
V i(µ− (1 + r)wi, σ) s.t. µ− qσ = (1 + r)wi,
16
where q = σ(l) > 0. We consider Uˆ i(xi) = V i(qσ, σ) induced by (7) and (8). We
obtain:
V i(qσ, σ) = σα
i
[∫ ∞
−q
(x+ q)α
i
d(T i ◦ Φˆ(x))− λi
∫ −q
−∞
(−x− q)αi d(T i ◦ Φˆ(x))
]
= σα
i
f i(q),
where f i(q) =
[∫∞
−q(x+ q)
αi d(T i ◦ Φˆ(x))− λi ∫−q−∞(−x− q)αi d(T i ◦ Φˆ(x))] is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing on IR+, f
i(0) ≈ −0.34 and f i(q)↗∞ as q ↗∞.
Thus for all agents i = 1, . . . , I, there exists exactly one qi > 0 such that
f i(qi) = 0. It follows that for 0 < q < qi, investor i’s optimal allocation is the
risk free asset, for q = qi the investor is indifferent between all possible alloca-
tions and for q > qi investor i’s optimal behavior consists in infinitely leveraging
the market portfolio. Thus as soon as the investors are a little heterogenous
no equilibrium exists. Figure 2 shows the Tversky and Kahnemann indifference
curves in the (σ, µ) plane. For all pricing portfolios ` such that q 6= qi, no
solution to the individual optimization problem can exists under Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) assumptions for the utility functions.
Our proposal.
We suggest to consider the following utility index
u(x) =
{ −λ+ exp(−αx) + λ+ for x ≥ 0,
λ− exp(αx)− λ− for x < 0, (11)
where α ∈ (0, 1), λ− > λ+ > 0. Figure 1 shows that u(x) approximates the
Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) utility index very well for values around zero.
We presume that the experimental evidence given for the utility specification
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) foremost concerns the shape of the utility
function around zero. Note also that the utility function we propose is different
to that of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for very high stakes because it is
less linear than theirs. Our theoretical analysis thus suggest to conduct further
experiments in this direction. For sake of simplicity we take T (p) = p for all
p ∈ [0, 1]. As it will be seen later for this specification financial markets equilibria
are robust with respect to introducing some heterogeneity of agents’ preferences.
For any agent at any consumption bundle, x ∈ X, µ(∆x) = µ, σ(∆x) = σ we
obtain (see Appendix):
U(∆x) = V (µ, σ) =
∫
IR
u(σ∆y + µ) dΦˆ(∆y)
= (λ+ + λ−)Φˆ
(
µ
σ
)
− λ−
+ e
1
2
σ2α2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
.
17
Figure 3 shows the indifference curves of V in the mean and standard deviation
space. The partial derivatives of V are
∂µV (µ, σ) = α e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
+ λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
,
∂σV (µ, σ) = α
2 σ e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
−α (λ− − λ+) ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
)
.
where ϕˆ = Φˆ′ is the density function for the standard normal distribution. The
ratio
S(µ, σ) = −∂σV (µ, σ)
∂µV (µ, σ)
gives the slope of the indifference curve at some point in the mean and standard
deviation space. The following properties hold:
(i) ∂µV (µ, σ) > 0,
(ii) ∂σV (µ, 0) = 0, ∂σV (µ, σ) < 0 for σ > 0
3
and limσ→∞ ∂σV (µ, σ) = 0 for all µ > 0,
(iii) S(µ, 0) = 0 and S(µ, σ) > 0 for all µ > 0,
(iv) limµ
σ
→∞ S(µ, σ) = ασ for all σ > 0 fix,
(v) limσ→∞ S(µ, σ) =∞ for all µ > 0.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Note that property (ii) implies that the
condition µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω needs to hold in equilibrium also under our proposal for
the utility index. In fact, as we have already shown in the Remark in the pre-
vious section, µ(ω) ≤ ∗` ·ω holds in equilibrium only if some investor’s optimal
allocation is a risky investment with same return as the risk-free asset, a contra-
diction to property (ii).
The final property we need to show is the quasi-concavity of V . Tobin (1958) has
3Property 2 expressed in Meyer (1987) states that when the class of considered risks is
generated by a location and scale parameter condition, then for V given by (1), ∂σV (µ, σ) ≤ 0
if and only if the utility index u satisfies u′′(µ + σ x) ≤ 0 for all µ + σ x. Since the utility
index (11) does not satisfy u′′(µ + σ x) ≤ 0 for all µ + σ x, one could expect our statement
to contradict Property 2 in Meyer (1987). But this is not the case, since the necessity of the
condition on u for Property 2 in Meyer (1987) holds, if and only if all considered risks have
bounded support, which is obviously not the case under the normal distribution assumption.
Indeed, our example shows that the necessity condition does not hold for risks with unbounded
support.
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already pointed out that quasi-concavity of the mean-variance utility function
V is ultimately linked to the concavity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function u. Indeed, as Sinn (1983) has shown, concavity of u easily implies
quasi-concavity of V . In the case of prospect theory u is however convex-concave.
Hence, quasi-concavity of V depends on whether on average the distribution of
∆x puts more weight on the convex or on the concave part of u. The condi-
tion µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω, which needs to hold in equilibrium as shown above, ensures
that equilibrium allocation on average have positive excess return. Note also
that loss-aversion, i.e. the feature that u is steeper for losses than for gains,
contributes to the concavity of u and hence to the quasi-concavity of V . In-
deed, it turns out that our choice of the parameters λ+, λ− and α leads to a
quasi-concave utility function V (see Figure 3). This puts us into the position
of proving our final claim:
Proposition 5 (Existence of CAPM-equilibria)
Under the assumptions (1) and (2) and for the specification of the CPT-utility
functions given by (9), for any given riskfree rate r, there exist financial market
equilibria with µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω.
Proof.
Consider the standard deviation of the market portfolio, σ(ω). by the mean-
variance-principle (Corollary 1), we need to find a price
∗
q such that
∑
i σ
i(
∗
q) =
σ(ω), where
σi ∈ arg max
σ∈IR+
V i(qσ, σ).
From the boundary behavior of the agents indifference curves (i) to (v) that we
showed above, it follows for all i = 1, . . . , I that for q → 0 σi(q) = 0 and for
q →∞ σi(q) =∞. Hence for sufficiently small prices of risk, q, market demand∑
i σ
i(
∗
q) is smaller than market supply σ(ω) while for sufficiently large prices it
is larger. Since by the quasi-concavity of preferences demand is continuous, from
the intermediate value theorem we get the existence of some equilibrium with
∗
q > 0. Finally, note that
∗
q > 0 is equivalent to µ(ω) >
∗
` ·ω.
5 Conclusion
Under the assumption of normally distributed returns, we have shown that the
Cumulative Prospect Theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is consistent
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with the Capital Asset Pricing Model in the sense that in every financial market
equilibrium the Security Market Line Theorem holds. However, we did also show
that under the specific functional forms suggested by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) financial market equilibria do not exist. We suggested an alternative
functional form consistent with the results of Tversky and Kahneman for which
equilibria do exist.
The functional form we suggest differs from that of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) with respect to the behavior for large stakes. This suggests to collect
experimental evidence with large stakes since for the existence of equilibria the
behavior of agents at the boundary of their consumption space is essential.
The CAPM analyzed in this paper is a standard two periods model. While
much of the intuition for the general intertemporal CAPM can already be given
in the two periods model still it would be very interesting to check the consistency
of prospect theory and the CAPM also in the intertemporal model. In particular
it is unclear whether the intertemporal CAPM is consistent with possible shifts
in the reference point. Moreover, in the intertemporal model returns will be en-
dogenous and most likely not normally distributed, giving prospect theory some
chance to differ from mean-variance analysis. For recent papers incorporating
some aspects of prospect theory in intertemporal models see Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) and also Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001).
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Appendix
First we prove that
(0)
V (µ, σ) = (λ+ + λ−)Φˆ
(
µ
σ
)
− λ−
+ e
1
2
σ2α2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
,
if
u(x) =
{ −λ+ exp(−αx) + λ+ for x ≥ 0,
λ− exp(αx)− λ− for x < 0, (12)
where α ∈ (0, 1), λ− > λ+ > 0.
(i) ∂µV (µ, σ) > 0,
(ii) ∂σV (µ, 0) = 0, ∂σV (µ, σ) < 0 for σ > 0 and limσ→∞ ∂σV (µ, σ) = 0 for all
µ > 0,
(iii) S(µ, 0) = 0 and S(µ, σ) > 0 for all µ > 0,
(iv) limµ
σ
→∞ S(µ, σ) = ασ for all σ > 0 fix,
(v) limσ→∞ S(µ, σ) =∞ for all µ > 0.
Proof.
(0)
U(∆x) = V (µ, σ) =
∫
IR
u(σ∆y + µ) dΦˆ(∆y)
=
∫ ∞
−µ
σ
(
−λ+e−α(σx+µ) + λ+
)
dΦˆ(x) +
∫ −µ
σ
−∞
(
λ−eα(σx+µ) − λ−
)
dΦˆ(x)
= λ+
(
1− Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
))
− λ− Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
)
+
+ λ− eαµ
∫ −µ
σ
−∞
eασx dΦˆ(x)− λ+ e−αµ
∫ ∞
−µ
σ
e−ασx dΦˆ(x)
= (λ+ − λ−) Φˆ
(
µ
σ
)
− λ− +
+ λ− eαµ
∫ ∞
µ
σ
e−ασx dΦˆ(x)− λ+ e−αµ
∫ ∞
−µ
σ
e−ασx dΦˆ(x)
= (λ+ − λ−) Φˆ
(
µ
σ
)
− λ− +
+ e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
.
23
For the last equality, we use that
∫∞
z e
−ασx dΦˆ(x) = e
1
2
α2σ2Φˆ (−ασ − z).
(i)
From (0) we obtain
∂µV (µ, σ) = α e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
+ λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
,
thus ∂µV (µ, σ) > 0 for all µ and σ.
(ii)
From (0) we obtain
∂σV (µ, σ) = α
2 σ e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
−α (λ− − λ+) ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
)
.
It follows:
• ∂σV (µ, 0) = 0, using that Φˆ(−∞) = 0, Φˆ(∞) = 1 and ϕˆ(∞) = 0.
• Let us consider f(µ, σ) = σ−1 e− 12α2σ2 e−αµ ∂σV (µ, σ) for σ > 0 . We show
that f(µ, σ) < 0.
Suppose that for some µ? and σ(µ?) > 0, f(µ, σ(µ?)) > 0. Since f(µ, ·)
is continuous, limσ→0 f(µ, σ) = −λ+ e−2αµ < 0 and limσ→∞ f(µ, σ) = 0
for all µ > 0, we can assume without loss of generality that σ(µ?) > 0 is
a local maxima of f(µ?, ·). We compute the partial derivative of f with
respect to σ. We have
∂σf(µ, σ) = ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
+ ασ
) [
λ−(µσ−2 − α) + λ+(µσ−2 + α)
−α−1 (λ− − λ+)
(
µ2σ−4 − α2 − σ−2
)]
Let η = σ−2, then
∂σf(µ, σ) = 0 ⇔ η
[
−λ
− − λ+
α
µ2 η + (λ− + λ+)µ+
(λ− − λ+)
α
]
= 0
⇔ η ∈ {0, η?(µ)}
where η?(µ) = αµ (λ
−+λ+)+(λ−−λ+)
(λ−−λ+)µ2 . Moreover, for η > η
?(µ), ∂σf(µ, σ) < 0
and for 0 < η < η?(µ), ∂σf(µ, σ) > 0. It follows that σ
?(µ) = η?(µ)−1/2 > 0
is the unique (local) maximum/minimun of f(µ, ·) and since for σ > σ?(µ),
∂σf(µ, σ) > 0 and for 0 < σ < σ
?(µ), ∂σf(µ, σ) < 0, σ
?(µ) is a minimum.
This contradicts the existence of µ? and σ(µ?) local maxima of f(µ?, ·) such
that f(µ?, σ(µ?)) > 0. Hence, f(µ, σ) < 0 and therefore ∂σV (µ, σ) < 0.
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• limσ→∞ ∂σV (µ, σ) = 0 for µ > 0 since limσ→∞
(
σ e
1
2
σ2α2 eαµ Φˆ(−µ
σ
− ασ)
)
=
limσ→∞
(
σ e
1
2
σ2α2 e−αµ Φˆ(µ
σ
− ασ)
)
= 1
α
√
2pi
and limσ→∞ ϕˆ(
µ
σ
) = 1√
2pi
.
(iii)
Follows directly from (i) and (ii).
(iv)
S(µ, σ) = −∂σV (µ, σ)
∂µV (µ, σ)
= −α
2 σ e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
− λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
α e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
+ λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
+
α (λ− − λ+) ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
)
α e
1
2
α2σ2
[
λ− eαµ Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
+ λ+ e−αµ Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
)]
= −
ασ
[
λ−
Φˆ(−µσ−ασ)
Φˆ(µσ−ασ)
− λ+ e−2αµ
]
λ−
Φˆ(−µσ−ασ)
Φˆ(µσ−ασ)
+ λ+ e−2αµ
+
(λ− − λ+) ϕˆ(
µ
σ
+ασ)
Φˆ(µσ−ασ)
λ−
Φˆ(−µσ−ασ)
Φˆ(µσ−ασ)
+ λ+ e−2αµ
.
For µ
σ
fix, we have
lim
σ→∞
Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
) = e−2αµ,
lim
σ→∞
ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
+ ασ
)
Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
) = e−2αµ lim
σ→∞
(µσ + ασ3)(−µ+ ασ2)
µ+ ασ2
.
and thus
lim
σ→∞S(µ, σ) =
λ− − λ+
λ− + λ+
lim
σ→∞
(
−ασ + (µσ + ασ
3)(−µ+ ασ2)
µ+ ασ2
)
=∞.
(v)
Let consider the equation for S given above. For σ fix, we have
lim
µ
σ
→∞
Φˆ
(
−µ
σ
− ασ
)
Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
) = 0,
lim
µ
σ
→∞
ϕˆ
(
µ
σ
+ ασ
)
Φˆ
(
µ
σ
− ασ
) = 0.
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and thus
lim
µ
σ
→∞
S(µ, σ) = ασ.
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Figure 1: Tversky and Kahneman (1992) utility index (full line) and u(x) =
−λ+ e−αx + λ+ for x ≥ 0 and u(x) = λ− eαx − λ− for x < 0 (dotted line), where
λ+ = 6.52, λ− = 14.7 and α ≈ 0.2.
27
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
sigma
0.
0 0
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
m
u
-0.15-0.1-0.05
 0
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05 0.10.1
0.15
Figure 2: Indifference curves in the mean and standard deviation space for the
utility function induced by Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) utility index and
probability transformation.
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Figure 3: Indifference curves in the mean and standard deviation space for
the utility function induced by u(x) = −λ+ e−αx + λ+ for x ≥ 0 and u(x) =
λ− eαx − λ− for x < 0 where λ+ = 6.52, λ− = 14.7 and α ≈ 0.2.
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